２０２６年度

成蹊大学大学院　入学試験問題

文学研究科

博士前期課程

英米文学専攻

課　題　文

２０２６年度
成蹊大学大学院文学研究科
英米文学専攻入試問題（課題文）

この冊子には、英米文学専攻の６つの専門分野の論文が収録されています。

① イギリス文学
② アメリカ文学
③ 英語教育学-1
④ 英語教育学-2
⑤ 英語学　理論言語学
⑥ 英語学　応用的研究

この中から、自分が大学院で専攻をする予定の研究分野の論文を一編選び、論文の英語の字義解釈とともに内容を十分に把握して、下記のとおり、試験当日にレジュメを用意して１５分程度のプレゼンテーションを行ってください。自分の現在の研究上の関心を中心にして論文への評論を加えた見解も入れてください。

レジュメ作成にあたっては、プレゼンテーションの内容を日本語及び200 語程度の英文にまとめてください。

＜プレゼンテーション試験のレジュメについて＞
次の（ａ）～（ｃ）の要領で準備をし、印刷したものを５部持参して、試験に臨んでください。

（ａ）Ａ４ サイズ片面×１枚とする。
（ｂ）モノクロ／カラーは問わない。
（ｃ）必要に応じ写真や図表などを使用しても構わない。

①

以下の英文は、ブラックブリティッシュ作家 Caryl Phillips のエッセイ "Extravagant Strangers" (2005)からとられたものである。次の問いに答えなさい。

1. 筆者はなにが「イギリスらしさ」を生み出してきたと考えているか、説明しなさい。

2. 筆者のリスボンでの体験を説明しなさい。

3. 「ブラック・ブリティッシュ」であることと、「イギリス人らしさ」との関係を説明しなさい。

The British character, like that of most nations, has been forged in the crucible of hybridity – of cultural fusion. And, of course, it is not just what the Americans term 'people of colour' who have contributed to this process of 'mongrelisation'. One immediately thinks of Defoe and his satirical poem 'The True-Born Englishman', a poem levelled against the English for their mistreatment of the Dutch who arrived on these shores with William III. Defoe catalogues the various groups who have made up this heterogeneous thing, the Englishman. He identifies Romans, Scots, Picts, Irish, Welsh, Saxons, Danes and a whole variety of French people. Clearly, over the centuries, British life at all levels, the royal family, the musical heritage, parliament, military, sport, entertainment and the city have been invigorated, shaped and to some extent defined by the fortuitously heterogeneous nature that is the national condition.

However, in the face of overwhelming evidence, the mythology of homogeneity not only exists, it endures. It also excludes and prevents countless numbers of British people from feeling comfortable participating in the main narrative of British life. At certain periods in my life I have been one of these people. I have, at times, recoiled in horror at the very notion of having my name yoked together with that of this nation. I have resisted allegiance to flag and to country. I have spectacularly failed Norman Tebbit's cricket test – simple-minded as it is – and, in common with thousands of others, I have had to learn to come to terms with a country that partly defines its historical sense of self by first identifying, and then excluding, the 'other'.

A large part of my British education has involved learning to recognise when fellow citizens are viewing me as little more than the 'other'.

For many British people, the idea that Britain has a history that has, over the years, been characterised by much ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity, would be to undermine their basic understanding of what it means to be British. As a writer I am interested in the way in which this continual influx of the 'other' into Britain – of colour or otherwise – has impinged upon the literary culture. Two years ago I began to look in earnest at the English literary canon, paying particular attention to those writers who might in some way be defined as the 'other'. And then, about a year ago, I realised that the writers I was most interested in were those who might be regarded as the 'other' in the most radical way. They were, all of them, not even born in Britain. (288–89)

But Britain remains a country for whom a sense of continuity with an imagined past continues to be a major determinant of national identity. Even if one speaks the language, attends the church, writes the books, builds the roads, bridges, cathedrals, one's right fully to participate in this society is always under threat from somebody or some institution which determines that you don't look, or act, or behave in a British-enough manner. If I had a pound for every time I've been told to go back to where I came from, I'd be a rich man. One's right to participate is always under scrutiny in ways as crude and as simple as the sentence a British diplomat in Portugal once shared with me when, having lost my passport in Lisbon, I was trying to obtain emergency papers to return home to Britain. 'Mr Phillips,' he said, 'you don't even look British.'

British writers not born in Britain will, as long as this situation goes unrepaired, continue to feel a personal ambivalence towards Britain. And as they settle at their desks to explore their ambivalence, they will discover new formal strategies which will expand our understanding of what is possible in literary form. This is a process which, as we stand on the threshold of a new century, shows no sign of letting up, for, despite Defoe's plea, Britain continues to display little interest in viewing 'outsiders' as the 'true-born Englishmen' that Defoe claims them to be. The richness of the British literary tradition may be an ironic by-product of this failure of national imagination. Personally, I would rather have a less vigorous literature, and a healthier nation in which the process of moving along the road from the 'outside' to the 'inside' was not burdened with so many psychological obstacles. Writers are generally able to negotiate these obstacles and even flourish while hurdling them. But, in case we forget, most of us are not writers. (296-97)

(2)

アメリカ文学

以下は Toni Morrison, *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* (1992) の一節です。この文章を読み、以下の設問に答えなさい。

My early assumptions as a reader were that black people signified little or nothing in the imagination of white American writers. Other than as the objects of an occasional bout of jungle fever, other than to provide local color or to lend some touch of verisimilitude or to supply a needed moral gesture, humor, or bit of pathos, blacks made no appearance at all. This was a reflection, I thought, of the marginal impact that blacks had on the lives of the characters in the work as well as the creative imagination of the author. To imagine or write otherwise, to situate black people throughout the pages and scenes of a book like some government quota, would be ludicrous and dishonest.

But then I stopped reading as a reader and began to read as a writer. Living in a racially articulated and predicated world, I could not be alone in reacting to this aspect of the American cultural and historical condition. I began to see how the literature I revered, the literature I loathed, behaved in its encounter with racial ideology. American literature could not help being shaped by that encounter. Yes, I wanted to identify those moments when American literature was complicit in the fabrication of racism, but equally important, I wanted to see when literature exploded and undermined it. Still, those were minor concerns. Much more important was to contemplate how Africanist personae, narrative, and idiom moved and enriched the text in self-conscious ways, to consider what the engagement meant for the work of the writer's imagination.

How does literary utterance arrange itself when it tries to imagine an Africanist other? What are the signs, the codes, the literary strategies designed to accommodate this encounter? What does the inclusion of Africans or African- Americans do to and for the work? As a reader my assumption had always been that nothing "happens": Africans and their descendants were not, in any sense that matters, there; and when they were there, they were decorative—displays of the agile writer's technical expertise. I assumed that since the author was not black, the appearance of Africanist characters or narrative or idiom in a work could never be about anything other than the "normal," unracialized, illusory white

world that provided the fictional backdrop. Certainly no American text of the sort I am discussing was ever written for black people—no more than *Uncle Tom's Cabin* was written for Uncle Tom to read or be persuaded by. As a writer reading, I came to realize the obvious: the subject of the dream is the dreamer. The fabrication of an Africanist persona is reflexive; an extraordinary meditation on the self; a powerful exploration of the fears and desires that reside in the writerly conscious. It is an astonishing revelation of longing, of terror, of perplexity, of shame, of magnanimity. It requires hard work not to see this.

It is as if I had been looking at a fishbowl—the glide and flick of the golden scales, the green tip, the bolt of white careening back from the gills; the castles at the bottom, surrounded by pebbles and tiny, intricate fronds of green; the barely disturbed water, the flecks of waste and food, the tranquil bubbles traveling to the surface—and suddenly I saw the bowl, the structure that transparently (and invisibly) permits the ordered life it contains to exist in the larger world. In other words, I began to rely on my knowledge of how books get written, how language arrives; my sense of how and why writers abandon or take on certain aspects of their project. I began to rely on my understanding of what the linguistic struggle requires of writers and what they make of the surprise that is the inevitable concomitant of the act of creation. What became transparent were the self-evident ways that Americans choose to talk about themselves through and within a sometimes allegorical, sometimes metaphorical, but always choked representation of an Africanist presence.

I have made much here of a kind of willful critical blindness— a blindness that, if it had not existed, could have made these insights part of our routine literary heritage. Habit, manners, and political agenda have contributed to this refusal of critical insight.

設問

（1）筆者は読者としてアメリカ文学を読んでいたときと、書き手としてアメリカ文学に関わるようになってからでは、アメリカ文学におけるアフリカ系アメリカ人（およびその文化・歴史）の表象のあり方についてどのように考えが変わったと言っているか。最終段落にある

willful critical blindness という表現を適切な日本語に訳した上で、その訳語を入れるかたちで答えなさい。

（2）ここで示されたモリスンの考えを踏まえながら、(アフリカ系アメリカ文学にかぎらず一般に）アメリカ文学における「他者」の表象のあり方について考えることを述べなさい。その際、具体的な作品を一つか二つ例にとって説明すること。

出典： Morrison, Toni. *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination*. Harvard University Press, 1992, pp. 15-18.

③

英語教育—1

問題1. Krashenの五つの仮説と学習の情報処理モデル(Information processing)の相違点に注目しながら、それぞれの考え方を簡潔に説明しなさい。

問題2. 上記の二つの考え方に基づいて、多読の読解力養成への効果について説明しなさい。

Second language applications: Krashen's 'Monitor Model'

Perhaps the best known model of second language acquisition influenced by Chomsky's theory of first language acquisition is Stephen Krashen's (1982) Monitor Model, first described in the early 1970s, at a time when there was growing dissatisfaction with language teaching methods based on behaviourism. Krashen described his model in terms of five hypotheses.

In the *acquisition/learning* hypothesis, Krashen suggests that we 'acquire' language as we are exposed to samples of language that we understand in much the same way that children pick up their first language—with no conscious attention to language form. We 'learn' on the other hand through conscious attention to form and rule learning. In Krashen's view, far more language is acquired than learned.

Next, according to the *monitor* hypothesis, second language users draw on what they have *acquired* when they engage in spontaneous communication. They may use rules and patterns that have been *learned* as an editor or 'monitor', allowing them to make minor changes and polish what the acquired system has produced. Such monitoring takes place only when the speaker/writer has plenty of time, is concerned about producing correct language, and has learned the relevant rules.

The *natural order* hypothesis was based on the finding that, as in first language acquisition, second language acquisition unfolds in predictable sequences, as we saw in Chapter 2. The language rules that are easiest to state (and thus to *learn*) are not necessarily the first to be *acquired*.

The comprehensible input hypothesis is that acquisition occurs when one is exposed to language that is comprehensible and contains *i + 1*. The '*i*' represents the level of language already acquired, and the '*+1*' is a metaphor for language (words, grammatical forms, aspects of pronunciation) that is just a step beyond that level.

Krashen's *affective filter* hypothesis is proposed to account for the fact that some people who are exposed to large quantities of comprehensible input do not necessarily acquire language successfully. The 'affective filter' is a metaphorical barrier that prevents learners from acquiring language even when appropriate input is available. *Affect* refers to feelings of anxiety or negative attitudes that, as we saw in Chapter 3, may be associated with poor learning outcomes. A learner who is tense, anxious, or bored may *filter out* input, making it unavailable for acquisition.

Information processing

Cognitive psychologists working in an information-processing model of human learning and performance see second language acquisition as the building up of knowledge that can eventually be called on automatically for speaking and understanding. Robert DeKeyser (1998), Richard Schmidt (2001) and others have suggested that learners must pay attention at first to any aspect of the language that they are trying to learn or produce. 'Pay attention' in this context is accepted to mean 'using cognitive resources to process information' but there is a limit to how much information a learner can pay attention to. Thus, learners at the earliest stages will tend to use most of their resources to understand the main words in a message. In that situation, they may not notice the grammatical morphemes attached to some of the words, especially those that do not substantially affect meaning. Gradually, through experience and practice, information that was new becomes easier to process, and learners become able to access it quickly and even automatically. This frees up cognitive processing resources to notice other aspects of the language that, in turn, gradually become automatic.

For proficient speakers, choosing words, pronouncing them, and stringing them together with the appropriate grammatical markers is essentially automatic. Furthermore, much of what these speakers say is drawn from predictable patterns of language that are at least partly formulaic. That is, fluent speakers do not create new sentences by choosing one word at a time but rather by using strings of words that typically occur together. This use of patterns applies not only to idiomatic expressions, but also to much conversational language and written language in a specific genre (Ellis, Simpson-Vlach, and Maynard 2008).

Another aspect of automaticity in language processing is the retrieval of word meanings. When proficient listeners hear a familiar word, even for a split second, they cannot help but understand it. Such automatic responses do not use up the kind of resources needed for processing new information. Thus, proficient language users can give their full attention to the overall meaning of a text or conversation, whereas less proficient learners use more of their attention on processing the meaning of individual words and the relationships between them. The lack of automatic access to meaning helps to explain why second language readers need more time to understand a text, even if they eventually do fully comprehend it. The information processing model suggests that there is a limit to the amount of focused mental activity we can engage in at one time.

Lightbown P. M. & Spade N. (2013). *How Languages are Learned.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.106-110

(5)

次の文章を読み、以下の問いに答えなさい。

問1
バイリンガルが一方の言語を理解している際、もう一方の言語も自動的に活性化されると考えられているか。本文の内容を踏まえ、そのことを示唆する現象について、少なくとも二つ挙げて説明しなさい。

問2
本文中で取り上げられている例の多くは、英語とオランダ語のように、同じアルファベット表記を用いる言語のバイリンガルである。では、日本語と英語のバイリンガルにおいても、同様の現象は観察されると考えられるだろうか。本文の議論を踏まえつつ、他の関連文献も参考にしながら説明しなさい。

Under many task conditions, a bilingual speaker's two languages compete. When bilinguals listen to speech, lexical entries and their corresponding semantic representations compete for activation and selection. When bilinguals speak, words from the two languages compete to gain control of the output mechanisms (the speech apparatus). Despite the conflict between the two languages and the accompanying possibilities for confusion, fluent bilinguals generally do not have any inkling that different lexical entries are simultaneously active (the same way monolingual speakers are rarely aware that semantically ambiguous words such as *bank* have more than one meaning). Despite opportunities for errors due to competition, bilinguals rarely use a word from the "wrong" language by mistake. Such mistakes do occur, however, especially when the bilingual speaker is under stress or is experiencing strong emotions (see Figure 11.3). Such mistakes are also more common when bilinguals are speaking in their less-dominant or well-practiced language (Poulisse and Bongaerts, 1994).

Given that bilinguals are usually unaware that their languages are in conflict and rarely make cross-language errors in production, is it possible that knowledge about their two languages really is stored separately in long-term memory? Why should we believe that the languages are in competition if subjective experience and overt behavior normally show no trace of such competition? Despite the apparent ease of access to context-appropriate language representations, at least among proficient bilinguals, laboratory research indicates that a bilingual's two languages often do compete both during language comprehension and speech. Let's consider each of these in turn.

What evidence suggests that both of a bilingual's languages are simultaneously activated during listening and comprehension? Some evidence comes from the *cognate advantage*. A *cognate* is a word in one language that has a counterpart in another language that is spelled or pronounced identically (or nearly so), and that has the same meaning. For example, the Spanish word *piano* is a cognate of the English word *piano*—they look alike, they sound alike, and they mean the same thing. In picture naming and translation, bilinguals (but not monolinguals) respond to cognates faster than non-cognates. Also, the N400 component of the ERP wave form is smaller for cognates than non-cognates, whether the cognate is presented in the bilingual participant's L1 or L2 (Christoffels et al., 2007; Peeters et al., 2013; see also Quirk and Cohen, 2022).

The *cognate advantage* occurs when the bilingual speaker is operating under monolingual task conditions where only one of the two languages is obviously relevant to the task, and when the bilingual speaker is operating under task conditions where responses in either language may be required—*bilingual mode*—whether the bilingual is responding in their stronger or weaker language. The cognate advantage is strongest when the two versions have the same orthography (spelling) and phonology (pronunciation); the advantage shrinks as the similarity in pronunciation across the two languages diminishes (Costa et al., 2000; Lemhofer et al., 2008; Schwartz et al., 2007; Soares and Grosjean, 1984; Van Hell and Dijkstra, 2002).[6] Bilingual speakers are also less likely to experience tip-of-the tongue states for cognates than other kinds of words (Gollan and

Acenas, 2004), suggesting that having two simultaneously activated lexical representations boosts the activation of the phonological codes that go with the cognate. The cognate advantage shows that both of the bilingual speaker's languages are active at the same time. If the bilingual could completely switch off the task-irrelevant language, cognate effects would not appear when the task requires only one of the two languages (but cognates are processed faster than non-cognates even when the bilingual thinks that the task involves only one language).

Further evidence for simultaneous activation and language competition comes from effects of *interlingual homographs* (Dijkstra et al., 1999; Kroll, 2006; but see Hoversten and Traxler, 2016). Interlingual homographs are words that look alike and sound alike, but that mean different things in different languages. They look and sound like cognates but they are not cognates. Because they look and sound similar but mean different things (and may be pronounced somewhat differently as well), such words are sometimes called *false friends*. For instance, the German word *chef*, meaning *boss*, looks and sounds like the English word *chef*, meaning *skilled food cooker*. When bilingual speakers read or hear interlingual homographs, they respond to them slower than words that appear in only one of their languages.

Interlingual homographs behave like (monolingual) semantically ambiguous words, and likely for the same reasons. For monolingual speakers of English, balanced ambiguous words take longer to read and name than unambiguous words, because the visual form of the word automatically activates multiple meanings, and competition between activated meanings slows selection and integration of a single meaning. Interlingual homograph effects show that the orthographic (spelling) and phonological (sound) form is shared between languages (to the extent that they have a similar script or a similar phonological system), and that hearing or seeing a given form automatically activates whatever semantic information is associated with that form.

Although language production provides clear opportunities for competition across languages, as the bilingual speaker has to choose which label to apply to a given concept, language input might selectively activate only a single language at a time. That is, the prosodic and phonological patterns of different languages can be quite distinct. Given that the input in the bilingual's L1 can sound very different from their L2, perhaps less conflict would occur in listening than in production. Regardless, when bilinguals listen to words, matching candidates from both of their languages

become activated, and accessing the context-appropriate meaning requires them to select from among the set of activated candidates. Further, activation does not respect the distinction between the two languages. Listening to L1 words activates L2 candidates, and listening to L2 words activates L1 candidates (Marian et al., 2021, 2003; Spivey and Marian, 1999).

Viorica Marian and colleagues tested whether spoken input activated one language only, or whether such input activated both the L1 and L2 lexicon. To do so, they presented Russian-English bilinguals with short instructions in Russian or English (e.g. *Click on the marker)* while they were looking at a set of pictures on a computer screen. The bilinguals carried out the instructions using a mouse to move the cursor over the appropriate target. Unbeknownst to the participants, some of the pictures on the screen had similar names in both English and Russian. For example, the Russian word for *stamp* is *marka*, which is pronounced similarly to the English word *marker*. These objects were labeled *distractors*, because the similarity in pronunciation might cause people to look at the wrong object (the stamp instead of the marker), *if* the phonological (sound) information activated the inappropriate language. If participants were able to switch off Russian while carrying out English instructions (or vice versa), they should avoid looking at the distractor objects. Monolingual English speakers almost never look at a picture of a stamp while hearing the word *marker*, because *stamp* shares very little phonology with *marker*. If Russian-English bilinguals can selectively activate English labels for objects, without activating Russian labels, they too should rarely look at the distractor *(stamp/marka)* while listening to *marker*. In fact, Russian-English bilinguals were far more likely to look at the stamp (*marka* in Russian) when the instruction said *Click on the marker*, compared to objects with totally unrelated names. Similarly, if the instructions were given in Russian (*Polozhi marku*, "put the stamp ..."), participants frequently looked at the object with the same-sounding English name (the marker). This result shows that, while comprehending speech, whether operating in the stronger or weaker language, mental representations from a bilingual's two languages are simultaneously activated and influence their behavior.

These results are also compatible with theories of mental representation proposing that lexical representations from the bilingual's two languages share space in long-term memory. That is, rather than being neatly partitioned into "Russian" and "English" bins, which are searched separately when a bilingual is listening to one versus the other language, looking at a picture

of a stamp while hearing the word *marker* shows that the phonological information is activating representations of meaning based on both phonology-to-L1 lexicon and phonology-to-L2 lexicon mappings. The data show that activation reaches all the way into the semantic (meaning) representations, and that activation of those meanings exceeds the minimum required to control behavior before the entire acoustic stimulus has been processed. (If bilinguals waited to do a complete analysis of the acoustic stimulus, they would never look at the stamp because the phonological codes for *marker* do not fully match the stored codes for *marku.)*

Bilinguals, like monolinguals, undertake a radical form of *incremental processing* when processing speech, as proposed by models like COHORT (see Chapter 3; Gaskell and Marslen-Wilson, 1997; Marslen-Wilson, 1973). That is, they begin to activate stored representations that encode different meanings immediately after they start to hear the beginning of a word, regardless of which of their languages is being spoken at the moment. So *mar-* activates two associated meanings from two different languages because there are two words, *marker* and *marka*, that have partially overlapping phonological representations, and the lexical access system does not switch off one language or filter out meanings that come from the "wrong" language. This does not mean that words in the two languages have identical phonological or lexical representations (if they did, a bilingual would not be able to tell the difference between Russian and English), and in fact neuroimaging data (Marian et al., 2003) show that Russian and English are associated with subtle differences in neural activity in Russian-English bilinguals. Specifically, Russian and English activated overlapping areas of Broca's and Wernicke's areas, but the point in the brain representing the *center of mass* (the spatial mid-point of the set of activated voxels) differed between Russian and English.[7]

These cohort-like effects that cross language boundaries are also reflected in cross-language neighborhood effects. In *progressive de-masking* experiments, a target word is displayed for a short time (about 10 ms) followed by a pattern that covers up the place where the target word appeared. Gradually, the exposure time for the target word increases, and the exposure time for the pattern mask decreases, until the subject is able to identify the target word. For bilinguals, target-word identification time depends on characteristics of the target word itself, such as how long and frequent it is in its own language, but it also depends on how many neighbors the target word has in the bilingual's other language (Van Heuven et al., 1998). Response times are especially slow when

the target word is in the bilingual's L2, and the orthographic neighbors—words that look like the target word—are from the bilingual's L1, and when the L1 neighbors occur more frequently or are more familiar than the L2 target word.

Further evidence for shared phonological and semantic representations comes from studies involving *pseudohomophones*. Pseudohomophones are words that are spelled like real words, but are not real words. *Tode* is a pseudohomophone of *toad*, and in monolingual readers, reading *tode* will prime the response to the word *frog* (which is associated with the word *toad)*. Pseudohomophone priming effects also occur between a bilingual's two languages. For example, the Dutch word for rope is *touw*. In a masked priming experiment, Dutch-English bilinguals responded faster to *touw* when it was preceded by the English pseudohomophone *roap*, which has the same phonological representation as *rope*, and which activates the Dutch word with the same meaning, *touw* (Duyck, 2005). If phonological activations were restricted to the target language (Dutch), *roap* would have no effect on behavior, because there is no word in Dutch that matches *roap*. The fact that *roap* speeds up the response to *touw* shows that English phonology is active while Dutch is being processed, and that English phonology makes contact with shared semantic representations (perhaps the concept representations in the CM and RHM accounts), which in turn facilitates processing of Dutch target words (see also Van Wijnendaele and Brysbaert, 2002).

Although a bilingual's two languages are simultaneously activated during a variety of language comprehension tasks, the two languages are not necessarily equally activated all the time. Most of the time, the dominant (usually the L1) is the more active of the two, and so the dominant language is more immune to influences coming from the L2 than vice versa (Jared and Kroll, 2001; Jared and Szucs, 2002).

To demonstrate the relative immunity of L1 lexical access to interference from a weaker L2, English-French bilinguals named English words that had French *enemies* (French words that look like the English target words but are pronounced differently) or control words that had no French enemies. The existence of French enemies did not affect how long it took English-French bilinguals to name the target words. Then, participants named a group of French words. Naming the French words presumably increased the activity of French spelling—sound patterns. After naming a bunch of French words, participants named another group of English words. This time, having a French enemy made a huge difference and response times were much slower. These results suggest that the L2 orthographic and phonological representations are normally less activated and may not substantially affect L1 function unless something happens that boosts the activation of the L2 representations (like saying a large number of words in the L2). Weaker L2 representations can affect performance in a stronger L1, but perhaps only when bilingual speakers have recently switched from their L2 back into their L1.

出典: Traxler, M. J. (2023). *Introduction to psycholinguistics: Understanding language science* (2nd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell.

(6)

博士前期課程　英語学 C 応用的研究

以下の文を読み、次の１～３の質問に答えなさい。

1. Syntagmatic analysis とは、何に焦点を当てたどのような言語分析を指すのか。例も挙げつつ説明せよ。
2. Paradigmatic analysis とは、何に焦点を当てたどのような言語分析を指すのか。例も挙げつつ説明せよ。
3. 過去６ヶ月以内に実際に発表された複数の英語新聞記事の文章を使って、同一の出来事（事件）が異なる媒体によってどのように違ったメッセージを持つナラティヴとして構成されているのか、syntagmatic analysis と paradigmatic analysis の２つの分析を通して解説せよ。

(2023).

(Mooney, A. & Evans, B. *Language, society and power; An introduction*, 6th ed. Routledge, pp.37-42 から一部抜粋)

2.6 A MODEL FOR ANALYSING LANGUAGE

The discussion of Lakoff and Johnson's metaphor theory demonstrates that ideologies are recoverable from language use. In order to identify the underlying ideology of a speaker or a text, we must try to identify the beliefs on which it relies. This requires a particular analytic lens. When we're trying to identify the ideologies and habits of thinking in our own culture, we need special tools to uncover what is often very difficult to see. In order to do this kind of analysis, it's important to understand that even though we may not be conscious of it (or even intend to), we make linguistic 'choices' when we use language. These choices are significant. Saussure provides us with a model for seeing what these choices are.

Figure 2.1 on p.24 is a visual representation of Saussure's model of the different relationships between the elements of an utterance. There are two axes we refer to in order to discuss the choices that are made when an utterance is created. The **syntagmatic** axis describes the order in which words are placed; the **paradigmatic** axis is used to refer to all the other words that could have been chosen for a particular slot. We can think of the syntagmatic axis as being horizontal and the paradigmatic as vertical, as shown in Figure 2.2.



Figure 2.2 Syntagmatic and Paradigmatic Axes

If we consider simple sentences such as those in Figure 2.2, there are a number of choices available. As we can see from the form of the verb, the first two examples are in the **active** voice (ate, consumed) and the second two in the **passive** (was scoffed, were devoured). The active sentences **foreground** – that is, draw attention to – the dog that ate the food. The passive sentences, in contrast, foreground the food. We saw a similar kind of foregrounding in relation to Greek word order. Thus, choosing between the active and the passive has an effect on what the reader's attention is drawn to. What the choice of the active means can only be understood in relation to all the other choices that could have been made: in relation to the passive, for example (Montgomery, 2008).

The paradigmatic axis has been represented as running vertically. In each position, a choice has to be made. Do we describe the dog's action as 'eating', 'consuming', 'scoffing', or 'devouring'? 'Eat' looks like the neutral choice, but it is still a choice. If 'scoffed' had been chosen, a negative attitude would immediately be signalled. 'Scoffed' only has meaning because of the relationship it has to all other linguistic signs and, most

Q: Was that made of? Metal?
A: I don't know what it is made of. It is like a silver bowl, an ashtray/bowl thing.

Q: Do you accept that you said 'metal' in your statement?
A: Yeah.

Q: Where did you intend to hit the defendant with it?
A: I just intended to hit him.

Q: Was it not your intention to hit him in the face?
A: No. It was not my intention. No. I was just going to hit him, but the way I was holding it, it would have caught him in the face. But I didn't hit him with it though.

Q: Right, but what did you declare to the interviewing officer what your intention was?
A: To hit him with it.

Q: Just to hit him, or to hit him in the face?
A: Just to hit him. Just to back him off.

Q: Do you accept that in your statement you said 'I grabbed Grant and picked up an ornamental box made of metal intending to hit David in the face with it'
A: Yes. That is what I said, yes, but I was not aiming for anything. I was just going to hit him.

(Cotterill, 2004: 525–526)

'"Smashing" someone in the face carries with it a sense of aggression and anger and the face is a particularly vulnerable part of the body, whereas the verb "hit", while still expressing violence, is less hostile in its orientation' (Cotterill, 2004: 526). Cotterill argues that these choices can create 'lexical landscapes' (2004: 528). That is, the word choices, the questions about witness word choices, and the negotiation of meaning can change the framing of the account. This may well work to persuade judges and juries about how particular events took place.

2.6.2 Transitivity

Looking at lexical choices is important. But there are other variables we need to consider. There are a variety of theories that make this possible. The following is a scaled-down version of Simpson's transitivity analysis (Simpson, 1993). Transitivity usually relates to whether a verb needs to take a direct object; 'hit' requires a direct object (something being hit), while 'sit' does not. 'Hit' is a **transitive** verb; 'sit' is an **intransitive** verb. Thus, **transitivity analysis** is concerned with who does what to whom/what. The difference between this model and others is that it has a slightly different terminology. This is because rather than describing the rules for a well-formed sentence (which is what some kinds of syntactic models do), this model includes information about the meaning of the clause.

Example 2.6 is a phrase that has two nouns and one verb. If we change the active form of the verb to the passive form, we have to change things around a bit to end up with a well-formed sentence. We have to change the form of the verb (from 'ate' to 'was eaten'), and we have to include a preposition ('by') before Fido.

Example 2.6

a Fido ate the bone.
b The bone was eaten by Fido.

As discussed earlier, example 2.6b starts with, and so focuses on, the bone. If we described these sentences in terms of nouns and verbs or subjects and objects, they would look the same: that is, both are structured noun, verb, noun, or subject, verb, object. We need the terminology provided by transitivity analysis that tells us which noun is doing the action to what. The doer is the actor, and that which something is done to is the goal. Verbs are always called process.

Example 2.7

ACTOR PROCESS GOAL
Fido ate the bone

You shouldn't think of the term 'goal' in the sense of something being aimed for. Dogs, broccoli, and people can all occupy the goal position. The goal 'represents the person or entity affected by the process' (Simpson, 1993: 89). Usually, sentences will have more than an actor, process, and goal. The detail that is often given can be labelled 'circumstances'.

In more comprehensive versions of this transitivity model, there is specific terminology for different kinds of verbs. 'Thinking', for example, is a 'mental process' while 'saying' is a 'verbal process'. In a similar way, the other roles have different terms in relation to these processes; for verbal processes, the 'actor' becomes the 'sayer' and the 'goal' the 'verbiage'.

The important thing is that even the stripped-down terminology of actor, process, goal, and circumstances allows us to describe the relevant difference between our two examples.

Example 2.8

	ACTOR	PROCESS	GOAL	CIRCUMSTANCES
a	Fido	ate	the bone	in the doghouse.
	GOAL	PROCESS	CIRCUMSTANCES	ACTOR
b	The bone	was eaten	in the doghouse	by Fido.

You probably know that in the passive form, the actor is not required for a well-formed sentence. If we take away the actor, we are left with Example 2.9.

Example 2.9

GOAL	PROCESS
The treats	were devoured.

Because the actor has been deleted, we call this choice 'actor deletion' or 'agent deletion'. Note that the 'circumstances' can be deleted, too, but that removal is not quite the same as the deletion of the actor, as circumstances provide additional information. When we are told that treats were devoured, we know that someone must have devoured them; they can't have been eaten without some actor intervention. Thus, the deletion of the actor serves to foreground the goal and background the person responsible. Sometimes, such deletion may be because of lack of information; we know that the treats were eaten, but we don't know who did it. In other cases, it can be to deflect blame from the actor. Consider the following headlines:

> COVID-19: Coronavirus patient caught after going on the run from Hong Kong hospital
>
> (*Sky News*, 21 December 2020)

> Hong Kong police catch fugitive COVID-19 patient
>
> (*The Straits Times*, 21 December 2020)

These headlines both describe the same event. But in the first example, readers are not told who caught the patient.

Example 2.10

	GOAL	PROCESS
a	Coronavirus	patient caught
	ACTOR	PROCESS GOAL
b	Hong Kong police	catch fugitive COVID-19 patient

In the first headline, we see an example of agent deletion. In the *Sky News* headline, the coronavirus is foregrounded. In the *Straits Times* headline, the police actions are highlighted. Notice that the second headline, in foregrounding the police and referring to the patient as a 'fugitive', links to ideas of criminality. This is less marked in the first headline, however; the patient is 'on the run'.

Choices about whether to use active or passive verbs, whether to delete actors, and which lexemes to use to describe activities and people are all important for telling a story. What readers are told and how they are told it are influenced by linguistic choices. By looking in detail at these choices (and others like them), we develop our 'critical awareness of language' (Fairclough, 1999: 73) and reconstruct the underlying ideology of the point of view. In order to do this, we need to look at more than one sentence. But generally, over a longer text, a pattern will emerge.